If investors are more averse to the risk of losses on the downside than of gains on the upside, investors ought to demand greater compensation for holding stocks with greater downside risk.
losses are weighted more heavily than gains in an investor's utility function. If investors dislike downside risk, they ought to demand higher compensations -in the form of higher expected returns -for holding assets with greater downside risk.
One natural extension of the CAPM, that takes into account this asymmetric treatment of risk, is the use of downside and upside betas (Bawa and Lindenberg, 1977) . These downside betas are the market betas computed over periods for which the market return is below its mean (downside periods). However, downside betas produce little variations in the cross-section of expected returns in the data, since they are affected by the changes in idiosyncratic volatility and in market volatility across downside and upside periods. In particular, many authors, including Campbell et al. (2001) , find that market volatility increases in down-markets and recessions.
Moreover, Duffee (1995) finds that idiosyncratic volatility decreases in down-markets. Both of these effects cause conditional beta to have little asymmetry across the downside and the upside.
In contrast, conditional correlations are immune from different volatility effects across upmarkets and down-markets, and exhibit significant asymmetries across downside versus upside moves by the market (Ang and Chen, 2001 ). This suggests that conditional correlations may be better able to capture the asymmetric nature of risk than conditional betas.
We find that stocks with high downside correlations, which we measure as highly correlated movements with the aggregate market in periods when markets fall, provide high expected returns. The portfolio of greatest downside correlation stocks outperforms the portfolio of lowest downside correlation stocks by 4.91% per annum. We show that downside correlations are not linked to low liquidity in down markets nor mechanically linked to past returns. After controlling for the market beta, the size effect, and the book-to-market effect, the greatest downside correlation portfolio outperforms the lowest downside correlation portfolio by 6.55% per annum.
Our research design follows the custom of constructing and adding factors to explain deviations from the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). 1 While this approach does not speak to the nature of the risk premia, our goal is not to present a theoretical model that explains how downside risk is priced in equilibrium.
Our goal is to demonstrate that a part of the factor structure in stock returns reflects variations in downside risk, measured by downside correlations. Not surprisingly, we find that while the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model cannot explain the variations in expected returns of stocks sorted by downside correlations, a factor reflecting the spread in expected returns induced by downside correlations explains these variations. We term this factor 'CMC', and find that it also helps to forecast economic downturns.
As an application of the CMC factor, we link the profitability of the Jegadeesh and Titman on the assumption that arbitrage is limited, so that arbitrageurs cannot eliminate the apparent profitability of momentum strategies. Mispricing may persist because arbitrageurs need to bear some undiversifiable risk, and risk-averse arbitrageurs demand compensation for accepting such risk (Hirshleifer, 2001) . We argue that these momentum strategies have high exposures to a systematic downside correlation factor. The intuition behind this story is that past winner stocks have high returns, in part, because during periods when the market experiences downside moves, winner stocks move down more with the market than past loser stocks.
The momentum portfolios load positively and significantly on the downside correlation factor. In particular, a linear two-factor model with the market and the CMC factor explains some of the cross-sectional variations among momentum portfolio returns. The downside correlation factor commands a significantly positive risk premium in cross-sectional tests, and retains its statistical significance in the presence of the Fama-French and momentum factors.
However, the downside correlation factor only modestly reduces the Carhart (1997) WML momentum factor premium by 2.18% per annum, and hypothesis tests reject that this factor can fully account for the momentum effect. 1 Other authors use factors which reflect the size and the book-to-market effects French, 1993 and 1996) , macroeconomic factors (Chen, Roll and Ross, 1986) , production factors (Cochrane, 1996) , labor income (Jagannathan and Wang, 1996) , market microstructure factors like volume (Gervais, Kaniel and Mingelgrin, 2001) or liquidity (Pástor and Stambaugh, 2001) , and factors motivated from corporate finance theory (Lamont, Polk and Saá-Requejo, 2001 ).
Our findings are closely related to other studies which use factor models to account for the high momentum returns. Harvey and Siddique (2000) demonstrate that skewness is priced, and show that momentum strategies are negatively skewed. Unlike skewness or other centered moments, our conditional correlation measure emphasizes the asymmetry of risk across downside and upside market moves. Our findings are also related to DeBondt and Thaler (1987) who find that past winner stocks have greater downside betas than upside betas. We find that the spreads in expected returns from downside beta are very weak since conditional betas are roughly constant across upside and downside periods. In contrast, downside correlation portfolios produce large cross-sectional variations in expected returns.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 investigates the relation between higher-order moments and expected returns. We show that portfolios sorted by increasing downside correlations have increasing expected returns. On the other hand, portfolios sorted by other higher moments do not produce any discernable pattern in their expected returns. Section 3 explores if the patterns across portfolios of downside correlations are robust after controlling for some known effects. Section 4 details the construction of our downside correlation factor and shows that it commands an economically significant risk premium. We apply the downside correlation factor to price the momentum portfolios in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Higher-Order Moments and Expected Returns
We start with the relations between centered moments and expected returns in Section 2.1.
Since this framework fails to produce significant spreads in expected returns, we turn our attention to downside and upside betas advocated by Bawa and Lindenberg (1977) in Section 2.2. High downside beta stocks have only slightly higher expected returns than low downside beta stocks. Section 2.3 examines the cause of this failure, and shows that the effect of changing idiosyncratic and market volatilities across downside and upside periods, masks the asymmetry of conditional betas across the downside and the upside. On the other hand, downside correlation is not affected by changing volatility effects, and exhibits highly asymmetric patterns across the downside and upside periods. Portfolio sorts based on downside correlations produce large spreads in expected returns, which we demonstrate in Section 2.4.
Centered versus Conditional Moments
Economic theory predicts that the expected return of an asset is linked to higher-order moments of the asset's return through the preferences of a marginal investor. The standard Euler equation
in an arbitrage-free economy is:
where § © £ is the pricing kernel or the stochastic discount factor and ' ( £ is the excess return on asset 
where R U T W V £ is the rate of return on the market portfolio, in excess of the risk-free rate.
The coefficient on R $ T W V £ in equation (2), 7 E £ e 1 f 3 Q 3 g B C 1 4 3 , corresponds to the relative risk aversion of the marginal investor. The coefficient on
is studied by Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) and motivates Harvey and Siddique (2000)'s coskewness measure, where risk-averse investors prefer positively skewed assets to negatively skewed assets. Dittmar (2001) examines the cokurtosis coefficient on
and argues that investors with decreasing absolute prudence dislike cokurtosis.
If the systematic component of skewness or kurtosis are priced, then stocks sorted by coskewness or cokurtosis should exhibit cross-sectional spreads in expected returns. When stocks are sorted into decile portfolios by increasing past coskewness, we do find that stocks with more negative coskewness have higher returns. However, the difference between the portfolio of stocks with the most negative coskewness and the portfolio of stocks with the most positive coskewness is only 1.79% per annum, which is not statistically significant at the 5% level (t-stat = 1.17). When we sort on cokurtosis, high cokurtosis stocks have slightly lower expected returns than low cokurtosis stocks, which is opposite of that predicted by theory. 
where £ is the excess stock return and Hence, while there appears to be a weak spread in the expected returns across downside betas, upside beta does not seem to be priced.
The Failure of Conditional Beta Measures
In this section, we investigate why the conditional beta measures fail to produce a significant relation between downside betas and expected returns. One reason why the effect of downside beta is weak is that there is little difference across downside and upside betas in the data, so the downside beta picks up very little asymmetry in risk. To further investigate the failure of the conditional betas, we decompose the downside and upside betas into a conditional correlation term and a ratio of conditional total volatility to conditional market volatility: 
As with the notation for downside and upside beta, when
, we abbreviate to
, and
The asymmetry in conditional correlations is much stronger than the asymmetry in betas across market downside and upside movements. Panel C of Figure (1 (6) is market volatility. Market volatility is asymmetric and higher after negative shocks to expected returns. Hence, conditional on the downside, the denominator of equation (6) 
Downside Correlations and Expected Returns
While the cross-sectional spreads of expected returns of stocks sorted on downside and upside betas are small, we now demonstrate that sorting on the correlation component of the beta produces a large spread in expected returns, in particular for downside correlations. The conditional correlations are asymmetric over downside and upside movements, as opposed to the relatively low asymmetry in conditional betas across the downside and upside. Conditional correlations are unaffected by different idiosyncratic and market volatility across upside and downside moves, whereas these effects cause conditional beta to have little downside versus upside asymmetry. Sorting on the other component of beta, the ratio of total to market volatility, produces no pattern in expected returns. Hence, conditional correlations may be better able to capture asymmetries in risk than conditional betas. The portfolio of stocks with the highest past downside correlations have the highest betas.
Since the CAPM predicts that high beta assets have high expected returns, we investigate in Section 3 if the high returns of these portfolios are explained by the market betas. However, the high returns on these portfolios do not appear to be attributable to the size effect or the book-to-market effect. The columns labeled "Size" and "B/M" show that high f p stocks tend to be large stocks and growth stocks. Size and book-to-market effects would predict high f p stocks to have low returns rather than high returns. The f p portfolios are also flat in leverage, so leverage also cannot be driving the pattern in expected returns.
We also control for the size and book-to-market effect using the Fama-French (1993) threefactor model. We take the time-series alphas from a regression of a f p decile's excess portfolio returns onto MKT, SMB and HML factors:
These alphas are reported in the column labeled 'FF ' of Table ( 2), and they maintain their nearly monotonic rankings. The difference in the Fama-French alphas between the decile 10 portfolio and the decile 1 portfolio is 0.53% per month, or 6.55% per annum with a p-value 0.00. Hence, the variation in downside risk in the f p portfolios is not explained by the FamaFrench model. In fact, controlling for the market, the size factor and the book-to-market factor increases the differences in the returns from 4.91% to 6.55% per annum.
The second to the last column calculates the post-formation conditional downside correla- 
Pricing the Downside Correlation Portfolios
In this section we conduct a battery of tests to try to price the downside correlation effect.
Section 3.1 examines if the expected returns on downside correlation portfolios can be explained by the market beta. Section 3.2 examines if these portfolio returns can be explained by the size effect, the book-to-market effect, or the momentum effect. Section 3.3 asks if the high downside correlation expected returns are robust across various subsamples. We show that downside correlation is not mechanically linked to past returns nor related to periods of low liquidity in Sections 3.4 and 3.5, respectively. Section 3.6 interprets our findings.
Can Market Risk Price Downside Correlation?
In Table ( 
Similar to the Fama-French time-series regressions, the alphas are still significant, with a difference of 0.44% per month, or 5.40% per annum, between the tenth and the first decile portfolios. A GRS test also rejects with a p-value of 0.00. Since the effect of downside correlation remains after controlling for the market beta, we conclude that downside correlation cannot be explained by market risk.
Can Other Risk Factors Price Downside Correlation?
While we can control for the effect of market beta by forming additional double-sort portfolios, this strategy quickly becomes difficult to implement if we try to control for the effects of multiple factors. In this section, we run Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional tests (described in the Appendix) to test if multiple risk factors can price the spread in expected returns produced by downside correlation. In particular, we focus on the standard Fama-French (1993) model, and augment this with the Carhart (1997) WML momentum factor.
To run these tests, we work with the 20 f p portfolios described in the previous section to control for the beta effect. 
where is the premium of factor . We also report the Carhart (1997) model factor premiums:
In both cases, the factor premiums are all statistically insignificant and the size premium is estimated to be negative. These results are driven by the inability of these standard factors to price the f p portfolios. We reject that the portfolio alphas are jointly zero using a GRS test.
In Figure ( 2), we plot the alphas and factor loadings from the Carhart four-factor model. 
Is the Downside Correlation Effect Stable Across Subsamples?
A simple robustness exercise is to check if the spread in the To conduct a more formal test for stability over different subsamples, we compute the difference between the alphas of the tenth and the first decile beta-controlled f p portfolios, which are reported in Table ( 4) . The difference in the alphas between portfolio 10 and 1 are statistically significant at the 1% level for both the three-factor and the four-factor models across the whole sample period. For the Fama-French model alphas in the first column, the alphas are still large and statistically significant when the sample is split into two separate calendar periods, and remain significant when the sample is split into NBER expansions and recessions.
In the last two columns of Table (4) we report the alphas from the four-factor model. These alphas are slightly smaller than the alphas from the Fama-French model and are also highly significant across NBER expansions and recessions. However, when the sample is split into two calendar periods, the difference in the alphas is near-significant (p-value = 0.06) over Jan 1964 -Dec 1981, but is highly statistically significant over the second period (Jan 1982 -Dec 1999). Nevertheless, the alphas are still of a large magnitude across various subsamples. A more serious concern is that since the alphas including the WML factor are smaller than the alphas from the Fama-French model, this raises the question that a large part of the high expected returns induced by high downside correlations may be due to momentum.
Is Downside Correlation Capturing Past Returns?
There are several similiarities between the Jegadeesh-Titman (1993) momentum effect and downside risk, which raises the concern that downside correlation is merely a noisy measure of past returns. First, like momentum, the downside correlation alphas are exacerbated by size and value effects (Fama and French, 1996; Grundy and Martin, 2001 ). Second, controlling for momentum in the time-series regressions reduces the alphas of the downside correlation portfolios. We show in this section that downside correlations are not mechanically linked to past returns, hence the momentum effect.
To disentangle the effects of past returns and downside correlations, we perform a double g sort across past 6 months returns and downside correlations. At each month, we first sort all stocks into quintiles based on their past 6 month returns. Then to control for past returns, we sort stocks within each past return quintiles into additional quintiles based on f p
. This procedure creates 25 portfolios, and we take the averages of the f p portfolios across past return quintiles.
We report the alphas from the Fama-French three-factor model of these five portfolios in Panel A of Table (5) . Controlling for past returns, these averages of downside correlation portfolios show cross-sectional dispersion in f p
. Their alphas are statistically significant, and the difference between the first and fifth portfolio alphas is 0.33% per month, which is also significant with a p-value = 0.00. In Table ( 4), controlling for momentum over the first subsample period (Jan 1964 -Dec 1981) yielded only a borderline significant result. Now, when we control for the momentum effect by the double portfolio sort, we find that the difference in the alphas becomes highly significant (t-stat = 2.50) over this first subsample period (Jan 1964 -Dec 1981). Hence, after controlling for momentum, high downside correlation stocks still have high returns.
Is Downside Correlation Liquidity?
A number of studies find that liquidity of the market dries up during down markets. Pástor , at each month, for each stock listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. This is done using monthly data over the previous 5 years from the following regression:
where £ is the aggregate liquidity measure.
Since each stock The average cross-sectional correlation is -0.0108, which is close to zero. We obtain the average 
Is Downside Correlation Risk?
Since the mean-variance framework is rejected by various asset pricing tests, it is not surprising that higher-order moments play a role in explaining cross-sectional variations in expected stock returns. However, which higher-order moments are important for cross-sectional pricing is still a subject of debate. We have shown that portfolios sorted by downside correlations produce large spreads in expected returns which cannot be explained by the market beta, the FamaFrench (1993) SMB and HML factors, by momentum, or by liquidity. The spread in returns is also robust across subsamples.
One puzzling result is why high downside correlation stocks exhibit significantly high variations in expected returns, while the difference in expected returns between stocks with high downside beta versus low downside beta is weak. Downside correlation is scaled to emphasize comovements in only direction, while downside beta measures both magnitude and direction.
We acknowledge that it is hard to think of a model where the magnitude does not matter but only the direction does. Even in models with one-sided constraints, for example binding short-sales However, downside correlation is the component of downside beta which is unaffected by changes in idiosyncratic and market volatilities across downside and upside movements.
Conditional correlations strongly differ across up and down markets. However, in down markets, idiosyncratic stock volatility decreases while market volatility increases (Duffee, 1995) . This means that the ratio of total volatility to market volatility decreases in down markets, which causes the betas to have little variations across downside or upside moves of the market. Conditional correlations are unaffected by changing idiosyncratic and market volatilities and they are much more asymmetric across market downside and upside periods.
Hence, conditional correlations are a good statistic to measure asymmetries in risk.
Lacking an economic model, we are reluctant to say that the high expected returns commanded by high downside correlation portfolios are due to risk. However, the standard risk factors cannot price, or even exacerbate, the expected returns of the downside correlation portfolios. In order to summarize this effect in a model, we capture the spread in returns produced by downside correlations by constructing a factor that mimicks this downside correlation effect. This factor should be able to price the downside correlation portfolios (by construction) and may also help explain other variations in the cross-section of expected stock returns.
A Downside Correlation Factor
In this section, we build a factor that reflects the high expected returns earned by stocks with high downside correlations. We describe the construction of this factor in Section 4.1, and show that it prices the downside correlation portfolios in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 shows that the downside correlation factor significantly predicts economic recessions.
Constructing the Downside Correlation Factor
We construct a downside correlation factor that captures the return premium between stocks with high downside correlations and stocks with low downside correlations, which we call the CMC factor for "high Correlations Minus low Correlations". The CMC factor goes long stocks with high downside correlations, which have high expected returns, and shorts stocks with low downside correlations, which have low expected returns.
In constructing the CMC factor, we are careful to control for the positive relation shown in Since we include every firm listed on NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ, and use daily data, the impact of small illiquid firms might be a concern. We address this issue in two ways. First, all of our portfolios are value-weighted, which reduces the influence of smaller firms. Second, we perform the same sorting procedure as above, but exclude firms that are smaller than the tenth NYSE percentile. With this alternative procedure, we find that CMC is still statistically significant with an average monthly return of 0.23% and a t-statistic of 2.04. These checks show that our results are not biased by small firms. (2000), and the WML momentum factor from Carhart (1997). The CMC factor has a monthly mean return of 0.23%, which is higher than the mean return of SMB (0.19% per month) and approximately two-thirds of the mean return of HML (0.32% per month). While the returns on CMC and HML are statistically significant at the 5% confidence level, the return on SMB is not statistically significant. CMC has a monthly volatility of 2.06%, which is lower than the volatilities of SMB (2.93%) and HML (2.65%). CMC also has close to zero skewness, and it is less autocorrelated (10%) than the Fama-French factors (17% for SMB and 20% for HML). The Harvey-Siddique SKS factor has a small average return per month (0.10%) and is not statistically significant. In contrast, the WML factor has the highest average return, over 0.90% per month. However, unlike the other factors, WML is constructed using equal-weighted portfolios, rather than value-weighted portfolios.
We list the correlation matrix across the various factors in Panel B of Table ( 6) . CMC has a slightly negative correlation with the market portfolio of -16%, a magnitude less than the correlation of SMB with the market (32%) and less in absolute value than the correlation of HML with the market (-40%). CMC is positively correlated with WML (35%). The correlation matrix shows that SKS and CMC have a correlation of -3%, suggesting that asymmetric downside correlation risk has a different effect than skewness risk. Table ( 6) shows that CMC is quite negatively correlated with SMB (-64%). To allay fears that CMC is not merely reflecting the inverse of the size effect, we examine the individual firm composition of CMC and SMB. On average, 3660 firms are used to construct SMB each month, of which SMB is long 2755 firms and short 905 firms. 2 We find that the overlap of the firms, that SMB is going long and CMC is going short, constitutes, on average, only 27% of the total composition of SMB. Thus, the individual firm compositions of SMB and CMC are quite different. We find that the high negative correlation between the two factors stems from the fact that SMB performs poorly in the late 80's and the 90's, while CMC performs strongly over this period.
To be sure that CMC is not merely reflecting the information already captured by the market, SMB, HML and WML, Panel C of Table ( 
Pricing the Downside Correlation Portfolios
The 20 downside correlation portfolios examined in Section 2 cannot be explained by the market, SMB, HML and WML factors. Our CMC factor ought to explain the variations of these downside correlation portfolios, since by construction it reflects the spread in expected returns due to cross-sectional variation in f p
. Model A of Table (7) is the traditional CAPM augmented with the CMC. The estimate of the premium on CMC is positive and statistically significant. Moreover, the GRS F-test cannot reject the hypothesis that the market factor augmented with CMC can price the variations in the downside correlation portfolio returns. The premium on CMC continues to remain positive and significant after adding the two Fama-French factors in Model B. It is also approximately the same as the mean CMC premium in Table ( 6) . The GRS test suggests that some of the portfolio returns are not explained by this model, but this result is only weakly significant (p-value = 0.04). Furthermore, in the presence of the market, the Fama-French factors, and CMC factor, WML still does not affect the significance of CMC. The GRS test suggests that this model, 2 SMB is long more firms than it is short since the breakpoints are determined using market capitalizations of NYSE firms, even though the portfolio formation uses all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ firms.
which incorporates CMC, explains the variations in returns of downside correlation portfolios.
In short, CMC successfully prices the downside correlation effect.
Forecasting Macroeconomic Variables
We briefly explore the relation between downside correlation and the business cycle by investigating how the downside correlation factor covaries with and macroeconomic variables.
The investigation in this section should be regarded as an exploratory exercise, rather than as a formal test of the underlying economic determinants of downside risk. Our analysis here 
where we use various macroeconomic variables for
Panel A of Table (8) lists the regression results from equation (12) . There is no significant relation between lagged macroeconomic variables and the CMC factor, except for the first lag of LEI, which is significantly negatively related with CMC. A 1% increase in the growth rate of LEI predicts a 27 basis point decrease in the premium of the downside correlation factor.
However, the p-value for the joint test (in the last column of Table ( 8) ) that all lagged LEI are equal to zero fails to reject the null with p-value=0.09. Overall, with the exception of LEI, there is little evidence of predictive power by macroeconomic variables to forecast CMC returns.
To explore if the downside correlation factor predicts future movements of macroeconomic variables we run regressions of the form:
We also include lagged macroeconomic variables in the right hand side of the regression since most of the macroeconomic variables are highly autocorrelated. Panel B of Table ( In general, these results show that high CMC forecasts economic downturns. The predictions of high CMC and future low economic activity is seen directly in the negative coefficients for HELP and IP. Term spreads also tend to be lower in economic recessions.
Estimates of Taylor (1993)-type policy rules on the FED over long samples, where the FED rate is a linear function of inflation and real activity, show short rates to be lower when output is low. Hence, the positive correlation of high CMC with future low HELP, low IP, low TERM and low FED shows that high CMC forecasts economic downturns. In other words, the reward for holding stocks with high downside risk is greater when future economic prospects turn sour, perhaps because the incidence of extreme market downside moves increases during recessions.
An Application to Pricing the Momentum Effect
That a CMC factor, constructed from the f p portfolios, explains the cross-sectional variation across f p portfolios is no surprise. Indeed, we would be concerned if the CMC factor could not price the f p portfolios. As an application of the CMC factor, we demonstrate that CMC has explanatory power to account for some of the momentum effect.
Data and Motivation
Why might we expect CMC to help explain some of the momentum effect? We first present evidence that momentum strategies tend to perform poorly when the market makes extreme During the full sample, the Fama-French alphas for winners are higher than losers. However, during periods of market distress, this pattern is reversed so winners perform worse than losers.
The very few observations during these extreme down periods means that we should be very reluctant to conclude that winners have higher downside risk than losers, especially given the very low levels of the t-statistics. Nevertheless, the point estimates do show that losers perform better than winners during market downturns. 3 We observe the same effect for the downside correlation portfolios from (9) shows that CMC has some explanatory power for WML which the other factors (MKT, SMB, HML) do not have.
Fama-MacBeth (1973) Cross-Sectional Test
We now conduct formal cross-sectional estimations of the relation between downside risk and expected returns of momentum returns in Table ( The loadings are estimated from the time-series regressions of the momentum portfolios on the factors from the first step of the Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedure. We see that for each set of portfolios, as we go from the past loser portfolio (decile 1) to the past winner portfolio (decile 10), the loadings on the market portfolio remain flat, so that beta has little explanatory power. The loadings on SMB decrease from the losers to the winners, except for the last two deciles. Similarly, the loadings on the HML factor also go in the wrong direction, decreasing monotonically from the losers to the winners.
In contrast to the decreasing loadings on the SMB and HML factors, the loadings on the CMC factor in Figure (4 Table   ( 9), which shows that past winner stocks do poorly when the market has large moves on the downside, while past loser stocks perform better in these extreme periods.
GMM Hypothesis Tests
Using GMM cross-sectional estimations (described in the Appendix), we can conduct some additional hypothesis tests for the goodness of fit for the various models in Table ( Although all pricing errors for the model of MKT and CMC fall within the two standard error bands, the HJ tests reject this model because because the HJ distance does not assign an equal weight to all the portfolios in the test. Hence, while momentum portfolios do seem to have exposure to downside risk, the CMC factor only modestly reduces the momentum premium by 2.18%, and although it comes out significant in cross-sectional tests with momentum assets, CMC cannot completely account for all the momentum effect.
Conclusion
We find that stocks with high downside correlations have higher expected returns than stocks with low downside correlations. The portfolio of stocks with the greatest downside correlations outperforms the portfolio of stocks with the lowest downside correlations by 4.91% per annum.
Downside correlation is distinct from market risk and liquidity risk, and it is not mechanically linked to past returns. Moreover, controlling for the market beta, the size effect and the book-tomarket effect increases the difference in the returns between the highest and the lowest downside correlation portfolios to 6.55% per annum. To capture this asymmetry, we construct a downside correlation factor (CMC) that goes long stocks with high downside correlations and goes short stocks with low downside correlations. The CMC factor is priced by portfolios of stocks sorted by downside correlations, and exposure to this downside correlation factor helps explain some of the profitability of momentum strategies.
While most economic models would suggest that both the magnitude and the direction of risk ought to matter, our downside correlation measure only captures the direction of downside comovements, but not the magnitude of the comovements. The decomposition of the betas show that the action of total and market volatilities confound the magnitudes of joint downside movements. In particular, the ratio of total to market volatility decreases on the downside, which causes conditional betas to exhibit little asymmetry across the downside and the upside.
In contrast, conditional correlations are immune to these effects and exhibit highly asymmetric patterns across downside and upside market movements. Hence, conditional correlations appear to be a cleaner measure of asymmetric exposure to risk than conditional betas.
While we show that high downside correlation stocks command high expected returns that 
Appendix

A Data and Portfolio Construction Data Sources
We use data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) to construct portfolios of stocks sorted by various characteristics of returns. We confine our attention to ordinary common stocks listsed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ, omitting ADRs, REITs, closed-end funds, foreign firms and other securities which do not have a CRSP share type code of 10 or 11. We use daily returns from CRSP for the period covering January 1st, 1964 to December 31st, 1999, including NASDAQ data which is only available post-1972. We use the one-month risk-free rate from CRSP and take CRSP's value-weighted returns of all stocks as the market portfolio. All our returns are expressed as continuously compounded returns. The 48 industry portfolios are from Fama and French (1997) and are obtained from Kenneth French's website at http://web.mit.edu/kfrench/www/data library.html. The Fama and French (1993) factors, SMB and HML, are also from the data library at Kenneth French's website.
Higher Moment Portfolios
We construct portfolios based on correlations between asset 
where
, is the residual from the regression of
²³ ¿´
o n the contemporaneous excess market return, and ¾ ¶ ¿´ i s the residual from the regression of the market excess return on a constant. Similar to the definition of coskewness in equation (A-1), we define cokurtosis as:
At the beginning of each month, we calculate each stock's moment measures using the past year's daily log returns from the CRSP daily file. For the moments which condition on downside or upside movements, we define an observation at time Ð to be a downside (upside) market movement if the excess market return at Ð is less than or equal to (greater than or equal to) the average excess market return during the past one year period in consideration. We require a stock to have at least 220 observations to be included in the calculation. These moment measures are then used to sort the stocks into deciles and a value-weighted return is calculated for all stocks in each decile. The portfolios are rebalanced monthly. Harvey and Siddique (2000) use 60 months of data to compute the coskewness defined in equation (A-1) for all stocks in NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. Stocks are sorted in order of increasing negative coskewness. The coskewness factor SKS is the value-weighted average returns of firms in the top 3 deciles (with the most negative coskewness) minus the value-weighted average return of firms in the bottom 3 deciles (stocks with the most positive coskewness) in the 61st month.
SKS and WML Factor Construction
Following Carhart (1997), we construct WML as the equally-weighted average of firms with the highest 30 percent eleven-month returns lagged one month minus the equally-weighted average of firms with the lowest 30 percent eleven-month returns lagged one month. In constructing WML, all stocks in NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ are used and portfolios are rebalanced monthly.
Liquidity Factor and Liquidity Betas
We follow Pástor and Stambaugh (2001) 
In 
Finally, the aggregate liquidity measure,
Ñ }
, is taken to be the fitted residuals, Ñ y » å ö . To calculate the liquidity betas for individual stocks, at the end of each month between 1968 and 1999, we identify stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ with at least five years of monthly returns. For each stock, we estimate a liquidity beta, º ø ³
, by running the following regression using the most recent five years of monthly data: 
Momentum Portfolios
To construct the momentum portfolios of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), we sort stocks into portfolios based on their returns over the past 6 months. We consider holding period of 3, 6, 9 and 12 months. This procedure yields 4 strategies and 40 portfolios in total. We illustrate the construction of the portfolios with the example of the '6-6' strategies. To construct the '6-6' deciles, we sort our stocks based upon the past six-months returns of all stocks in NYSE and AMEX. Each month, an equal-weighted portfolio is formed based on six-months returns ending one month prior. Similarly, equal-weighted portfolios are formed based on past returns that ended one months prior, three months prior, and so on up to six months prior. We then take the simple average of six such portfolios. Hence, our first momentum portfolio consists of á õ ¡ of the returns of the worst performers one month ago, plus á õ ¢ of the returns of the worst performers two months ago, etc.
Macroeconomic Variables
We use the following macroeconomic variables from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis: the growth rate in the index of leading economic indicators (LEI), the growth rate in the index of Help Wanted Advertising in Newspapers (HELP), the growth rate of total industrial production (IP), the Consumer Price Index inflation rate (CPI), the level of the Fed funds rate (FED), and the term spread between the 10-year T-bonds and the 3-months T-bills (TERM). All growth rates (including inflation) are computed as the difference in logs of the index at times In the first step, we use the entire sample to estimate the factor loadings, 
The factor premia, ¥ , are estimated as the averages of the cross-sectional regression estimates:
The covariance matrix of ¥ , , is estimated by:
where Û ¥ is the mean of ¥ . Since the factor loadings are estimated in the first stage and these loadings are used as independent variables in the second stage, there is an errors-in-variables problem. To remedy this, we use Shanken's (1992) 
GMM Cross-Sectional Tests
The standard Euler equation for a gross return, " ³ í , is given by:
Linear factor models assume that the pricing kernel can be written as a linear combination of factors:
where is a 
The GMM estimate of # is the solution to:
where C is a weighting matrix.
Hansen-Jagannathan (1997) Test
Jagannathan and Wang (1996) derive the asymptotic distribution of the HJ distance metric:
which can be interpreted as the least-square distance between a given pricing kernel and the closest point in the set of the pricing kernels that can price the base assets correctly. The asymptotic distribution of . We simulate the HJ statistic 100,000 times to compute the asymtotic p-value of the HJ distance. To calculate a small sample p-value for the HJ distance, we assume that the linear factor model holds and simulate a data generating process (DGP) with 432 observations, the same length as in our samples. The DGP takes the form:
where ²³ ¿´ is the covariance matrix of the factors. For each model, we simulate 5000 time-series as described above and compute the HJ distance for each simulation run. We then count the percentage of these HJ distances that are larger than the actual HJ distance from real data and denote this ratio empirical p-value. For each simulation run, we also compute the theoretic p-value which is calculated from the asymptotic distribution. , also computed using daily data over the past year into decile portfolios. This gives us 2 (º ) © 10 (· Í ) portfolios, making a total of twenty downside correlation portfolios. MKT is the CRSP value-weighted returns of all stocks. SMB and HML are the size and the book-to-market factors (constructed by Fama and French (1993) ), WML is the return on the zero-cost strategy of going long past winners and shorting past losers (constructed following Carhart (1997) ). T-statistics are computed using Shanken (1992) Fama and French (1993) ), WML is the return on the zero-cost strategy of going long past winners and shorting past losers (constructed following Carhart (1997)), and SKS is the return on going long stocks with the most negative past coskewness and shorting stocks with the most positive past coskewness (constructed following Harvey and Siddique (2000)). CMC is the return on a portfolio going long stocks with the highest past downside correlation and shorting stocks with the lowest past downside correlation. The first two columns show the means and the standard deviations of the factors, expressed as monthly percentages. Skew and Kurt are the skewness and kurtosis of the portfolio returns. Auto refers to first-order autocorrelation. Factors with statistically significant means at the 5% (1%) level are denoted with * (**), using heteroskedastic-robust Newey-West (1987) standard errors with 3 lags. The correlation matrix between the factors is reported in Panel B. Panel C reports the regression of CMC onto MKT, SMB, HML and WML factors, with t-statistics computed using 3 Newey-West lags. Tstatistics that are significant at the 5% (1%) level are denoted with * (**). The sample period is from January 1964 to December 1999. The table shows the results from Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression tests on 20 downside correlation portfolios. These portfolios are formed in the following fashion. Stocks are first sorted into two groups according to their past beta over the past year, using daily returns (high beta versus low beta). Each group consists of one half of all firms. Then, within each beta group, we rank stocks based on their · Í , also computed using daily data over the past year into decile portfolios. This gives us 2 (º ) © 10 (·¸) portfolios, making a total of twenty downside correlation portfolios. MKT is the CRSP value-weighted returns of all stocks. SMB and HML are the size and the book-to-market factors (constructed by Fama and French (1993) ), WML is the return on the zero-cost strategy of going long past winners and shorting past losers (constructed following Carhart (1997) ). CMC is the return on a portfolio going long stocks with the highest past downside correlations and shorting stocks with the lowest past downside correlations. T-statistics are computed using Shanken (1992) adjusted standard errors. GRS denotes the F-test of Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989) testing the hypothesis that the Å 's of all 20 portfolios are jointly zero. T-statistics that are significant at the 5% (1%) level are denoted with * (**). The sample period is from January 1964 to December 1999. Ç and lagged macroeconomic variables, but reports only the coefficients on lagged macro variables. Panel B lists the results from the regressions of macrovariables on lagged CMC and lagged macroeconomic variables, but reports only the coefficients on lagged CMC. LEI is the growth rate of the index of leading economic indicators, HELP is the growth rate in the index of Help Wanted Advertising in Newspapers, IP is the growth rate of industrial production, CPI is the growth rate of Consumer Price Index, FED is the federal discount rate and TERM is the yield spread between 10 year bond and 3 month T-bill. All growth rates (including inflation) are computed as the differences in logs of the index at time Ð is in months. FED is the federal funds rate and TERM is the yield spread between the 10 year government bond yield and the 3-month T-bill yield. All variables are expressed as percentages. T-statistics are computed using Newey-West heteroskedastic-robust standard errors with 3 lags, and are listed below each estimate. Joint Sig in Panel A denotes to the p-value of the joint significance test on the coefficients on lagged macro variables. Joint Sig in Panel B denotes the p-value of the joint significance test on the coefficients of lagged CMC. T-statistics that are significant at the 5% (1%) level are denoted with * (**). P-values of less than 5% (1%) are denoted with * (**). The sample period is from January 1964 to December 1999. Table ( 2). Alpha's from two samples are reported: over the full sample, and over a sample conditioned on the market return (MKT) being below two standard deviations from its mean. The full sample period is from January 1964 to December 1999. There are 41 observations where the market is less than two standard deviations from its unconditional mean, where both the mean and standard deviation are computed using the full sample. In Panel C, the table reports the time-series regression of the momentum factor, WML, onto various other factors. MKT is the market, SMB and HML are Fama-French (1993) factors, CMC is the downside risk factor, and SKS is the Harvey-Siddique (2000) skewness factor. The t-stat is computed using Newey-West (1987) heteroskedastic-robust standard errors with 3 lags. In Panel C, tstatistics that are significant at the 5% (1%) level are denoted with * (**). The sample period is from January 1964 to December 1999. The top panel shows portfolio alphas from the 20 · portfolios. These portfolios are formed in the following fashion. First, stocks are sorted into two groups according to their past beta over the past year, using daily returns (high beta versus low beta). Each group consists of one half of all firms. Then, within each beta group, we rank stocks based on their · , also computed using daily data over the past year into decile portfolios. This gives us 2 (º ) © 10 (· Í ) portfolios, making a total of twenty downside correlation portfolios. The portfolios 1-10 (11-20) are from the low (high) beta group. The p refers to formation period and q refers to holding periods. For each month, we sort all NYSE and AMEX stocks into decile portfolios based on their returns over the past p =6 months. We consider holding periods over the next 3, 6, 9 and 12 months. This procedure yields 4 strategies and 40 portfolios in total. The sample period is from January 1964 to December 1999. (equation (B-2) ). p refers to formation period and q refers to holding periods. For each month, we sort all NYSE and AMEX stocks into decile portfolios based on their returns over the past p =6 months. We consider holding periods over the next 3, 6, 9 and 12 months. This procedure yields 4 strategies and 40 portfolios in total. MKT, SMB and HML are Fama and French (1993)'s three factors and CMC is the downside correlation risk factor. The sample period is from January 1964 to December 1999. These plots show the pricing errors of various models considered in Section 5.2. Each star in the graph represents one of the 40 momentum portfolios with p s r i t or the risk-free asset. The first ten portfolios correspond to the q u r ¦ v month holding period, the second ten to the q u r $ t month holding period, the third ten to the q w r y x month holding period, and finally the fourth ten to the q y r c z ¤ { holding period. The 41st asset is the risk-free asset. The graphs show the average pricing errors with asterixes, with two standard error bands in solid lines. The units on the | -axis are in percentage terms. Pricing errors are estimated following computation of the Hansen-Jagannathan (1997) distance. The Carhart (1997) four-factor model consists of MKT, SMB, HML and WML factors.
